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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this survey is to report current case law devel-
opments affecting Montana criminal procedure. Montana Supreme
Court decisions from 1980 have been analyzed and briefly dis-
cussed where they reflect matters of concern to practicing attor-
neys. This survey presents only an overview of current develop-
ments, and does not include criminal procedures applicable under
1
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the Montana Youth Court Act.
I. SCOPE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment protects a person against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures of his person or property by the govern-
ment. It has been construed to protect people rather than places,1
and therefore, the scope of its protection encompasses any interest
in which the person has a legitimate expectation of privacy 2Whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy de-
pends upon the particular facts of each situation. In State v.
Allen' the Montana Supreme Court recognized that a person has a
legitimate expectation of privacy when he is a co-tenant in an
apartment and is present when the apartment is searched. The de-
fendant in Allen alleged that he shared an apartment with his girl-
friend. After receiving a complaint about a loud party in the apart-
ment, officers proceeded to the scene and smelled burning
marijuana. The officers were also aware that the defendant and his
girlfriend were drug users. According to the officers, the apartment
door swung open at the force of their knock, and they then viewed
marijuana lying on a coffee table. No search warrant had been
issued.
The defendant argued that the officers' entry was unlawful, as-
serting that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
apartment because it was his residence. The state contended that
the defendant lacked standing to object because certain facts indi-
cated that he should not be considered a permanent, principal resi-
dent of the apartment.5 Under these circumstances, the state ar-
gued that the defendant could have no legitimate expectation of
privacy.
1. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 101 S.Ct. 107 (1980).
3. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 718 (1980) (taxpayer's handwriting sam-
ples not protected by the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 330-
32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 107 (1980) (no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy where private conversation is overheard by others without the aid of electronic de-
vices); United States v. Allison, 619 F.2d 1254, 1259-60 (8th Cir. 1980) (union official has
reasonable expectation of privacy in records kept at union office); United States v. Carra,
604 F.2d 1271, 1272-73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979) (no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy where marijuana grows in public view).
4. - Mont. -, 612 P.2d 199 (1980).
5. Defendant alleged that although he was permanently residing in the apartment
with his girlfriend, he had no contractual relationship with the landlord.
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Relying upon Jones v. United StatesO and Rakas v. Illinois7
the court determined that the defendant had standing to object. In
Jones the defendant was present at the time a friend's apartment
was searched. The apartment's owner was out of town and had let
the defendant stay there in his absence. The United States Su-
preme Court held that "anyone legitimately on the premises where
a search occurs may challenge its legality." Subsequently, in
Rakas, the Court limited the Jones holding by recognizing that the
phrase "legitimately on the premises" was too broad a gauge for
measuring Fourth Amendment rights.9 Instead, the Court realized
that "a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other
than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him
from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place."10
Relying heavily on the facts presented in Allen, the Montana
Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had complete do-
minion and control over the apartment, and, with the exception of
his roommate, could exclude all others from it. Therefore, he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy and had standing to object to the
officers' actions.1"
B. Degree of Intrusion
The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches.
The reasonableness of a search is determined by balancing the de-
gree of intrusion against the benefit derived. 2 A search carried out
pursuant to a valid search warrant is per se reasonable; warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable.13 One way a warrantless search
may be reasonable, however, is if it is incident to a lawful arrest."
In State v. Ulrich15 the Montana Supreme Court considered
6. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
7. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
8. Jones, 362 U.S. at 267. Prior to Jones, a defendant moving to suppress evidence had
to first admit to the element of possession. Thus, if his defense was that he was never in
possession of the contraband, he could not ask that illegally seized evidence be suppressed
unless first admitted that it had been in his possession.
9. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141-43.
10. Id. at 142.
11. The defendant also asserted that Montana's constitutional right to privacy pro-
tects against this kind of warrantless entry, but this contention was never specifically
addressed by the court.
12. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 147 (1925); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 107 (1980).
13. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
14. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 60 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947).
15. - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 1218 (1980).
1981]
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the scope of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. The
defendant had appeared at the stationhouse after officers discov-
ered that the woman he was living with had died of gunshot
wounds. The defendant was immediately arrested at the sta-
tionhouse, and, despite his request for an attorney, officers admin-
istered a neutron activization test. The neutron activization test
consisted of wiping cotton swabs across the defendant's hands to
retain evidence of any gunpowder residues. It was established in
district court that no force was used in obtaining this evidence.
While the defendant did not resist this test, neither did he specifi-
cally consent to it. The district court ordered that the test results
be suppressed because the defendant had not consented to it and
because he had been denied his right to counsel. On appeal the
state argued that this was a search incident to a lawful arrest and
was reasonable under Schmerber v. California.'
The defendant, however, argued that under Cupp v. Murphy'7
the state was required to show a likelihood that the evidence would
have been lost or destroyed had the officers attempted to obtain a
search warrant. The supreme court rejected this rationale, conclud-
ing that a search incident to a lawful arrest needs no additional
justification so long as it is conducted within the permissible scope
of searches incident to arrest.'" The court reasoned that because
the intrusion in this case was minimal and because the search and
manner in which it was conducted were reasonable, the state was
not required to show that the evidence was destructible."9 Al-
though such an affirmative showing had been made in Schmerber,
the Montana Supreme Court found nothing to indicate that it was
required in order to justify a warrantless search.' 0
II. ARRESTS
A. Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
seizures requires that all arrests be based on probable cause. Mon-
16. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the warrantless extraction of blood from the
defendant was found to be reasonable.
17. 412 U.S. 291 (1973). In Cupp, the warrantless taking of scrapings from the defen-
dant's fingernails was constitutionally permissible.
18. Ulrich, - Mont. -, 609 P.2d at 1220-22.
19. Id.
20. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 1221. In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice Sheehy rea-
soned that the protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments would be lost unless the
state was required to justify its warrantless search by presenting evidence that the gun-
powder residues would have been lost or destroyed in the time a warrant could have been
obtained. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 1222.
[Vol. 42
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tana law provides that an officer may make the warrantless arrest
of a person if he has reasonable grounds" to believe that the per-
son is committing an offense, or that the person has committed an
offense and the existing circumstances require his immediate ar-
rest.22 The Montana Supreme Court has recently expanded the
means by which an arresting officer may obtain probable cause.
In State v. Hamilton," a warrantless arrest was made by an
officer who had overheard the commission of a homicide during a
telephone call received at the stationhouse. The defendant was ar-
rested minutes later at the scene,2 ' but argued that by the time the
officers arrived, the crime had already been committed. He con-
tended that his mere presence at the scene did not justify the ar-
rest,25 and that there was sufficient opportunity for obtaining a
warrant since there were no existing circumstances requiring his
immediate arrest.2
The supreme court rejected this argument, holding instead
that "[w]hat the officer heard on the telephone led him to reason-
ably believe that the defendant was presently committing an of-
fense. The warrantless arrest pursuant to that belief minutes later
was proper regardless of whether or not the existing circumstances
required his immediate arrest. '2 7 Additionally, the court recog-
nized that the right to make warrantless arrests is broader in fel-
ony cases than in misdemeanor cases.2 8
This decision expands the means by which an officer may be
21. Reasonable grounds is synonymous with probable cause. State v. Fetters, 165
Mont. 117, 122, 526 P.2d 122, 125 (1974).
22. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 46-6-401(4) (1979).
23. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1121 (1980).
24. The defendant was arrested in the home he shared with his mother after officers
arrived and discovered his mother's body. The defendant appeared bruised and scratched
and had a small trickle of blood on his head. Id. at -, 605 P.2d at 1124.
25. The court found that this was a correct statement of the law. See Hamilton, -
Mont. -, 605 P.2d at 1125. But cf. State v. Fetters, 165 Mont. 117, 124, 526 P.2d 122, 126
(1974) (mere presence of defendant's car in area near scene of crime plus the personal infer-
ences of officers did not constitute probable cause for arrest); State v. Hull, 158 Mont. 6, 16-
17, 487 P.2d 1314, 1320 (1971) (where defendant was arrested at a "pot party" there was a
greater degree of connection with illegal activities); State ex rel. Glantz v. District Court,
154 Mont. 132, 139, 461 P.2d 193, 197 (1969) (mere fact that a person is on premises where
officers have reason to believe there are drugs will not justify arrest).
26. See MCA § 46-6-401 (1979).
27. Hamilton, _ Mont. -, 605 P.2d at 1126 (emphasis added).
28. Id. "The usual rule is that a police officer may arrest without a warrant one be-
lieved by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony, and that he may
only arrest without a warrant one guilty of a misdemeanor committed in his presence." Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1924). In Montana, however, MCA § 46-6-401(4)
(1979) provides that an officer may make a warrantless arrest if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the person is committing an offense.
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considered to have gained knowledge of an offense by specifically
including knowledge derived over the telephone. The court stated
that "knowledge of the commission of an offense in the officer's
presence may be gained by him through a mechanical apparatus,
and an offense is deemed committed in. . . his presence. . . when
he hears the disturbance and proceeds at once to the scene. '29
In State v. Davis30 the court upheld a warrantless arrest where
the arresting officers admitted that they did not have sufficient
personal knowledge to establish probable cause to arrest the defen-
dant. The arresting officers were part of a special team watching an
informant purchase drugs from the defendant. The officers who
were watching this transaction from a distance testified that they
were personally unable to observe any of the defendant's actions
and that they had not personally observed the defendant commit
any offense. The officers did, however, observe special hand signals
from the informant and were in contact with other officers by
radio.
Recognizing that these facts were not unusual for undercover
operations, the court found that there were enough facts and cir-
cumstances within the officers' knowledge that they could reason-
ably believe that the defendant was presently committing an of-
fense. 1 The court found that although "no one officer may have
had sufficient personal knowledge to establish probable cause,...
if the information is considered collectively and is evaluated on the
basis of the information available to the law enforcement officers
as a group, it was sufficient to establish probable cause. '32
Both the Davis and Hamilton decisions are consonant with
the supreme court's prior recognitions that although an officer may
make a warrantless arrest on the basis of perceptions derived from
sight, he is not limited to information derived solely through that
sense." The Davis decision, however, is the court's first express
recognition that the collective perceptions of two or more officers
may constitute probable cause.
29. Hamilton, _ Mont. -, 605 P.2d at 1126.
30. - Mont. -, 620 P.2d 1209 (1980).
31. Id. at _, 620 P.2d at 1212-13.
32. Id. at -, 620 P.2d at 1212 (emphasis added).
33. Accord, State v. Means, 177 Mont. 193, 581 P.2d 406 (1978) (odor of burning mari-
juana and other facts were sufficient to establish probable cause); State v. Schoendaller, 176
Mont. 376, 578 P.2d 730 (1978) (perception of the odor of burning or burnt marijuana by
itself falls closer to realm of suspicion than probable cause); State v. Bennett, 158 Mont.
496, 493 P.2d 1077 (1972) (officer's perception of the odor of burning marijuana tends to
establish probable cause of the present commission of the offense); State v. Hull, 158 Mont.
6, 487 P.2d 1314 (1971) (information from informant plus smell of burning marijuana is
sufficient to establish probable cause).
[Vol. 42
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B. Merchant Detentions
An arrest 4 may be made by either a peace officer or a private
person, although the authority of a private person to make a war-
rantless arrest is generally more limited.30 The situations in which
a private person may make a warrantless arrest are authorized by
statute.3 6 For example, in Montana a merchant with probable
cause to believe that a person is shoplifting in his store has been
authorized by statute to stop and temporarily detain that person
to ascertain whether a theft has actually been committed.3 7 Re-
cently, however, in Duran v. Buttrey Food, Inc.," the Montana
Supreme Court determined that the portion of the Montana
merchant detention statute which allows a merchant to detain a
suspected shoplifter for up to thirty minutes without making an
arrest violates both the right of privacy"9 and the right of freedom
against unreasonable searches and seizures40 guaranteed by Mon-
tana's Constitution.
Although the defendant in Duran was accused of shoplifting,
she was permitted to return to her friend's car in the store parking
lot after an employee's search of her purse revealed no stolen
items. While waiting in the car, the defendant was approached by
a store employee who grabbed her purse and searched it again, but
found nothing. The defendant was then "guarded' 1 by another
store employee until the police arrived. Only after the police ar-
rived twenty minutes later was the defendant actually placed
under arrest and taken back into the store. The defendant was
cleared of theft charges in a district court trial and subsequently
brought an action against the store for false arrest and malicious
34. The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed the question of what
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Mendenhall, -
U.S. - 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980) (seizure occurs when by means of a physical force or a show of
authority the person's freedom of movement is restrained); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979) (seizure occurs where defendant is taken to the stationhouse and would have
been restrained if necessary, regardless of whether formal arrest had occurred). In Montana,
however, an arrest occurs whenever there is an actual restraint of the person or whenever
there is submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. MCA § 46-6-401(4)
(1979).
35. Compare MCA § 46-6-401 (1979) (arrest by a peace officer) with MCA § 46-6-402
(1979) (arrest by a private person).
36. MCA § 46-6-402 (1979).
37. MCA § 46-6-502, -503 (1979). A merchant who follows these prescribed procedures
is not liable for damages to the suspect unless the merchant has acted with malice. MCA
§ 46-6-503(3) (1979).
38. - Mont. -, 616 P.2d 327 (1980).
39. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
40. Id. § 11.
41. - Mont. -, 616 P.2d at 329.
1981]
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prosecution.
In deciding that merchants and other private citizens are not
given the same powers as are peace officers in the stop-and-frisk
situation, 2 the supreme court emphasized that, in this case, there
had been a very serious invasion of the defendant's right to
privacy:
We fail to discern a compelling state interest which would justify
the very serious invasion of a person's privacy which occurs when
she is publicly stopped and detained for up to 30 minutes by pri-
vate individuals who search her purse and cause her great in-
dignity and embarrassment, all under the immunity ostensibly
granted by [the merchant detention statute]. While it is true that
merchants and their employees as private individuals have a right
to defend their property, that right does not amount to a compel-
ling state interest which would justify allowing the merchant or
his employee to invade the privacy of another individual to the
extent permitted under [the merchant detention statute] .4
III. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
With the advent of modern electronic devices, it has become
possible for one person to monitor and record the conversations of
another, to monitor the location and movements of another, and to
trace the origin of telephone calls. While the use of these devices
certainly aids in crime prevention and detection, their uncontrolled
use may be perceived as a threat to individual privacy.
Recent decisions have reflected this concern and courts and
legislatures generally have begun to control the use of eavesdrop-
42. Id. at -, 616 P.2d at 334. See biso MCA § 46-5-401 (1979).
43. Duran, - Mont. -, 616 P.2d at 332. By not purporting to decide any issue other
than the unconstitutionality of the thirty-minute detainment, the court has left open the
argument that a merchant's detainment might in fact be an arrest. One California court
explained that
[a]lthough the line at times might be a fine one, there is a well-settled distinction
in law between an arrest and a detention. A detention is a lesser intrusion upon a
person's liberty requiring less cause and consisting of briefly stopping a person for
questioning or other limited investigation.
Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 591 n.5, 595 P.2d 975, 982 n.5, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 198, 204 n.5 (1979). This distinction may prove to be critical where the suspect who
has been detained or arrested seeks to sue the merchant for false arrest or malicious prose-
cution. It has been held that a merchant may assert a probable cause defense where he has
merely detained the suspect, but not where he has arrested the suspect. See Cervantez, 24
Cal. 3d at 591, 595 P.2d at 981-82, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 205. Thus, it is arguable, in cases where
the merchant does not affirmatively arrest the suspected shoplifter, that nevertheless, an
arrest has been made if the purpose of a brief stop for questioning or other limited investi-
gation has been greatly surpassed. This distinction is probably inconsequential under Mon-
tana law since MCA § 46-6-503(3) (1979) expressly provides that the probable cause defense
applies to both detention and arrest.
378 [Vol. 42
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ping techniques. Montana is no exception. In 1978 the Montana
Supreme Court endorsed the practice of obtaining judicial authori-
zation prior to electronic interception of the activities of criminal
suspects and held that the recordings and transcripts obtained
through the use of unauthorized monitoring devices were properly
suppressed on constitutional grounds." It was subsequently held,
in State v. Jackson,5 that prior judicial authorization is not re-
quired where the state does not introduce or attempt to introduce
the evidence obtained through the use of electronic recordings.
One facet of the legality of intercepting phone calls or the re-
cording of conversations was settled in State v. Hanley."6 In that
case, the supreme court ruled that peace officers may intercept,
transmit, or record private conversations if one of the parties to
the conversation freely consents,"' and that the unauthorized mon-
itoring of a telephone conversation does not defeat the legality of a
subsequently authorized monitoring of a drug transaction to which
the conversation led. In Hanley an informant recorded a telephone
call placed to him by several individuals, one of whom was the de-
fendant. There was no prior judicial authorization for this record-
ing. The conversation detailed a later meeting at which a drug sale
would take place. The meeting was then monitored with judicial
authorization. Although it was never introduced into evidence at
trial, the tape of the initial telephone conversation was referred to
during direct examination of a detective, and was handed to him
while he was on the stand. Defense counsel previously had moved
to suppress this tape and all evidence derived from it under the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine since it had been recorded
without a court order and later served as a basis for authorization
to monitor the subsequent meeting and sale. The court found
State v. Jackson48 to be controlling and ruled that the tape did not
affect the admissiblity of the evidence presented. The court stated:
Since the authorities here obtained the consent of the District
Court to the monitor [sic] of the sale ... on the basis of the par-
44. State v. Brackman, - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978). Brackman was decided solely
on Montana's constitutional right of individual privacy. For an analysis see Survey, Crimi-
nal Procedure: The Exclusionary Rule, 40 MoNT. L. REv. 132, 133-39 (1979).
45. - Mont. -, 589 P.2d 1009 (1979).
46. - Mont. _, 608 P.2d 104 (1980).
47. The will of the consenting party must not have been subjected to overbearing pres-
sure from the authorities. United States v. Baynes, 400 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd 517
F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975).
48. - Mont. -, 589 P.2d 1009 (1979). The Hanley opinion did not consider whether
the references to the tape at trial constituted an attempt to introduce it into evidence, or
whether this reference might have prejudiced the jury.
1981]
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ticipant's consent, and since appellant could have no reasonable
expectation that the person he was dealing with . . . was not in
fact an informer, no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth
Amendment is involved. . . and the monitoring and recording of
the conversation was permissible even under state law."
In State v. Bassett50 the supreme court faced an argument
similar to that presented in Hanley. An informant wore a body
monitor during three meetings with the defendant, a suspected
drug dealer. There had been no judicial authorization for this mon-
itor. The authorities then obtained a court order for the monitor
and set up three more meetings between the defendant and the
informant. Although the first three recordings were not used at
trial, the defendant argued that the information derived from them
was used to support the applications for the authorization to moni-
tor the subsequent meetings and therefore should be suppressed
under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Yet, the court de-
termined that there was no more taint in this case than there was
in Hanley.
Finally, in State v. Case,61 the court held that the application
for judicial authorization need not particularly describe the place
involved, since it is usually impossible to pinpoint the actual loca-
tion where a conversation will occur. Instead, the court literally in-
terpreted Montana's search warrant provision which requires only
that the "thing, place, or person to be searched" need be described
with particularity,' emphasizing the conjunctive language.
IV. IDENTIFICATION
Identification of a suspect by a witness is one method used to
verify that the suspect actually committed a crime. It may also
provide evidence to be used against the suspect at trial. While dan-
ger of misidentification is always present, it is increased where an
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure is used." To curb
the use of unnecessarily suggestive procedures, the United States
Supreme Court has announced two constitutional safeguards.
49. Hanley, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d at 110.
50. - Mont. _, 614 P.2d 1054 (1980).
51. - Mont. _, 621 P.2d 1066 (1980).
52. MCA § 46-5-201 (1979).
53. See, e.g., Summit v. Bordenkircher, 608 F. 2d 247, 249 (6th Ci r. 1979), cert.
granted, 445 U.S. 926 (1980).
54. The unreliability of eyewitness identification under suggestive circumstances has
been widely recognized. See, e.g., Comment, Protection of the Accused at Police Lineups, 6
COLUM. J. L. Soc. PROS. 345, 360-73 (1973) (citing many sources); ALI CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROcEDURE, § 160.2 (1975).
[Vol. 42
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One safeguard entitles the defendant to counsel at any corpo-
real identification involving the defendant after an adversary crim-
inal proceeding has been initiated against him. The presence of
defense counsel is expected to deter the use of unnecessarily sug-
gestive police practices and to facilitate the reconstruction at trial
of any impropriety." The other safeguard establishes that evidence
of a pretrial identification must be excluded if, under the totality
of the circumstances surrounding it, the identification procedure
was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mis-
taken identification that it violates the minimal requirements of
due process."1
In Montana, as in many other states, suspect lineups are not
often used. Instead, police officers may simulate the lineup situa-
tion by showing the witness several photographs of suspects. This
method is advantageous because it is easily used and spares inno-
cent suspects the embarrassment of arrest and lineup.58 It has been
recognized generally that "identification from a still photograph is
substantially less reliable than identification of an individual seen
in person."5 Nevertheless, it is not necessary that defense counsel
be present when the photographs are shown to the witness, regard-
less of whether the defendant has been arrested or formally
charged. 0s
Recently, in State v. Strain,' the Montana Supreme Court
heard arguments proposing that Montana adopt the rule whereby
once a defendant is in custody, the right to counsel must attach to
any photograph identification session (even for the investigation of
a crime unrelated to the one for which the defendant was taken
into custody). It was also argued that Montana adopt the rule en-
titling defendants to a physical lineup rather than a photographic
lineup. These arguments were based upon Michigan case law 2
55. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). It must be noted that these cases do not limit
the claim for a right to counsel if there exist independent and adequate state grounds for
requiring the presence of counsel prior to the initiation of the adversary proceeding.
56. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 231-32, 236 (1967).
57. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
58. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
59. California Supreme Court Justice Traynor noted this as early as 1960 in People v.
Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (1960).
60. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973), An in-court identification of the
defendant is permitted if it is determined that the pretrial identification process did not
violate these rules. State v. Dahl, - Mont. -, 620 P.2d 361, 364 (1980).
61. - Mont. -, 618 P.2d 331 (1980).
62. People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 186, 205 N.W.2d 461, 476 (1973). Accord, State
v. Wallace, 285 So.2d 796, 801 (La. 1973).
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which has recognized that "eyewitness identification through pho-
tographs is at least as hazardous as corporeal identification and
probably is more hazardous to the securing of the correct identifi-
cations." 3 The Michigan Supreme Court decided that not only
does the right to counsel attach to any photograph identification
sessions, but that identification by photograph should normally not
be used when the suspect is in custody and available for personal
identification procedures."
The Montana court, without comment, refused to adopt these
rules and adhered to the position that photographic identifications
are allowed, but will be scrutinized for reliability.65 The United
States Supreme Court, in Simmons v. United States,"6 considered
pretrial identification by photograph and determined that even
though an identification procedure may fall short of due process, a
reversal is not required if the witness' ability to identify the defen-
dant on other occasions was plainly independent of the suggestive-
ness of the challenged procedure.6 In subsequent cases, the Court
began to focus on the reliability of the identification rather than
the propriety of the initial procedure," and concluded that due
process is satisfied if a court can find that the proffered identifica-
tion "possesses certain features of reliability." 9 Montana has
adopted these same "features of reliability. '70
The Montana Supreme Court's refusal to provide the right to
counsel at photograph identification sessions means that the defen-
dant must rely on principles of due process for protection against
unfair procedures. In Strain7 1 a female defendant contended that
the photographs used by a witness to identify her were unnecessa-
rily suggestive because she wore glasses and only one of the four
photographs displayed a woman in glasses. The court found that
although this procedure connoted suggestiveness, it did not
63. People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 186, 205 N.W.2d 461, 475-76 (1973).
64. Id. at 186-87, 205 N.W.2d at 476.
65. Strain, _ Mont. -, 618 P.2d at 331.
66. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
67. Id. at 385. See also State v. Dahl, _ Mont. -, 620 P.2d 361, 364 (1980).
68. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
69. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977). The Court in Manson judged
reliability according to five factors enumerated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200
(1972): (1) the identifying witness' opportunity to view the suspect at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of any earlier description of the sus-
pect; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation; and (5) the lapse of time
between the crime and the confrontation.
70. State v. Pendergrass, - Mont. -, 586 P.2d 691, 697 (1978). Accord, State v. Higley,
- Mont. _, 621 P.2d 1043, 1049-50 (1980).
71. _ Mont. -, 618 P.2d 331 (1980).
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amount to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifi-
cation since each woman in the photographs resembled the others
and all matched the general description provided by the witness. 72
Any identification procedure may be attacked on the basis
that it was unnecessarily suggestive. This includes corporeal identi-
fications. The Montana Supreme Court recently held that the
identification of the defendant in a police vehicle shortly after the
commission of the crime was not unnecessarily suggestive." It has
also been held that identification by the use of only one picture is
permissible when it appears the identification is highly reliable. 74
V. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
The policy of the Fifth Amendment, as illustrated through its
application in Miranda v. Arizona,"7 operates to mitigate the coer-
cive influences inherent in custodial interrogations and may limit
the admissiblity of a suspect's confessions. Any statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda are inadmissible in the prosecutor's
case-in-chief,"' but may be admissible for the limited purpose of
impeaching the defendant, provided the statements are shown to
be voluntary.77 Involuntary statements may not be admitted for
any purpose.78 In the most recent Montana cases the Montana Su-
preme Court has done little more than analyze facts, seeking to
determine from the totality of the circumstances whether there
was sufficient evidence in each case to support the district courts'
findings that the statements were voluntary.9
The court, in State v. Allies,8" however, had its first occasion
to consider what has become known as the "cat-out-of-the-bag"
doctrine relating to consecutive confessions. This doctrine may be
applicable when the defendant makes an otherwise admissible con-
72. Id. at -, 618 P.2d at 335.
73. Spurlock v. Crist, - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 498, 501 (1980).
74. State v. Higley, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1043, 1049-50 (1980).
75. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that prior to interrogation, law enforcement
officials advise suspects that they have the right to remain silent, that any statements made
may be used against them, that they have the right to an attorney, and that an attorney will
be appointed for them if they are unable to afford one. The suspect may knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily waive these rights.
76. Id. at 479.
77. Oregon v. Hass, 421 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225
(1971). For a discussion of factors used in Montana to determine voluntariness, see Survey,
Criminal Procedure, 41 MONT. L. REV. 329, 330-49 (1980).
78. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1968).
79. See State v. Allies, - Mont. _, 621 P.2d 1080 (1980); State v. Davison, - Mont. -
614 P.2d 489 (1980).
80. - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1080 (1980).
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fession after a prior inadmissible one.81 Under this doctrine the
subsequent confession may be held inadmissible if it is so closely
related to the prior one that it can be said that "the facts of one
control the character of the other.""2 Where the subsequent confes-
sion is made to a friend or relative not acting for the police, the
courts consider whether there was a sufficient break in the stream
of events between the two confessions which will justify admitting
the subsequent confession into evidence."'
In Allies, the police obtained an inadmissible confession while
the defendant was in custody in a hospital psychiatric ward. He
was later transferred to another institution where he made incul-
patory statements to his girlfriend. The district court concluded
that the second set of inculpatory statements was a fruit of the
prior inadmissible confession and, therefore, was also inadmissi-
ble.84 On appeal the state alleged several factors which indicated
there had been a break in the stream of events between the two
confessions: (1) Passage of time-the original confession occurred
on December 12, 1976, and the subsequent one occurred in late
January or early February, 1977; (2) Change in location-each
confession occurred in a different place; (3) Manner of interro-
gation-the first confession was obtained by police officers and a
psychiatrist while the second confession was induced by the defen-
dant's girlfriend; (4) Representation by counsel-the first confes-
sion occurred while the defendant was not represented by counsel
while the second confession occurred after the defendant had con-
sulted with his appointed counsel."'
The supreme court upheld the district court's finding of inad-
missibility despite these arguments by the state, noting that the
determination of whether the causative link between the two con-
fessions has been broken is a factual determination."
VI. THE PLEA
A. Guilty Pleas
Before a guilty plea will be accepted, a court must be con-
81. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
82. Id. at 561.
83. State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 183, 450 P.2d 364, 373 (1969) (retrial mandated by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
84. Allies, _ Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1088.
85. Id. at _, 621 P.2d at 1088.
86. Id. Defense counsel contended that these facts were controlling: (1) the defendant
had been continuously incarcerated; (2) the settings of both admissions were similar institu-
tions; and (3) the defendant was diagnosed as mentally ill during the period involved. Id.
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vinced that the defendant made the plea voluntarily, understand-
ingly, and intelligently."7 These requirements are essential because
a defendant who pleads guilty waives important constitutional
rights: (1) the right to counsel;as (2) the privilege against self-in-
crimination;89 (3) the right to a jury trial;90 and (4) the right to
cross-examination and to confront witnesses and evidence against
him. 1
The Montana Supreme Court now requires district court
judges to conduct a thorough guilty plea colloquy prior to accept-
ance of the plea to assure that these requirements are met.2 Mon-
tana law provides that the court should refuse to accept a guilty
plea without first determining that the plea is voluntary with an
understanding of the charge. The supreme court has further enu-
merated required elements of a colloquy checklist: (1) defendant's
understanding of the charge filed against him, the elements of the
crime, the possible alternative charges and the maximum sen-
tence;" (2) the possibility of threats, misrepresentations or bribes
by either the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel;9" (3) defen-
dant's state of mind;" (4) competency of counsel;97 and (5) the to-
tality of the circumstances."
A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea. MCA § 46-16-105(2)
(1979) provides in pertinent part: "at any time before or after
judgment the court may, for good cause shown, permit the plea of
guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." (Em-
phasis added.) In In re Brown," the defendant contended that, be-
cause his guilty plea was accompanied by a declaration of inno-
cence, the district court erred in accepting his guilty plea before it
established a factual basis in the record to support the plea. The
supreme court held, however, that there is no constitutional prohi-
87. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
88. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
90. Id. amend. VI.
91. Id. See Boykin v. Alabama, 397 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (considered the rights set
forth in text accompanying footnotes 88 through 90 supra).
92. State v. Lewis, 173 Mont. 1, 582 P.2d 346 (1978); State ex rel. Gladue v. District
Court, 175 Mont. 509, 575 P.2d 65 (1978); State v. Azure, 175 Mont. 189, 573 P.2d 179
(1977).
93. MCA § 46-12-204(2) (1979).
94. State v. Azure, 175 Mont. 189, 195, 573 P.2d 179, 183 (1977).
95. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); State ex rel. Gladue v. District
Court, 175 Mont. 509, 511, 575 P.2d 65, 66 (1978).
96. State v. Lewis, 173 Mont. 1, 6, 582 P.2d 346, 349 (1978).
97. Id.
98. Boykin v. Alabama, 397 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
99. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 185, 187 (1980).
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bition against accepting the guilty plea of a defendant who denies
his actual guilt.100
There is no set standard to be applied by a court in handling
motions to withdraw a guilty plea.101 The trial court's decision con-
cerning a motion to withdraw is subject to review only upon a
showing of an abuse of discretion. 10 2 In Brown, no abuse of discre-
tion was found. The record (state's affidavit and transcript of the
arraignment) established a substantial factual basis for the plea,
and further showed the defendant's almost obstinate insistence
that he be allowed to plead guilty to charges of felony-theft, delib-
erate homicide, sexual intercourse without consent, robbery, and
aggravated assault. 03 The Brown court also held that the defen-
dant's dislike of the security quarters was not per se a factor in
determining voluntariness of a guilty plea, because the record
clearly showed that defendant was under no compulsion to enter
his plea.'04
State v. Haynie,'"5 sets forth three important considerations
involved in a defendant's attempt to withdraw a guilty plea. These
are: (1) adequacy of the district court's colloquy concerning defen-
dant's understanding of the plea; (2) promptness of the motion to
withdraw; and (3) the fact that the plea resulted from plea
bargaining.
Although an indigent criminal defendant has a right to counsel
at sentencing, this right to counsel may be lost by a knowing and
understanding waiver."" In Haynie, the defendant, who was ac-
cused of 11 sex crimes, knowingly and understandingly waived his
right to more extensive counsel at sentencing where he rejected an
offer to consult with his stand-in counsel, and where he entered his
plea of guilty of sexual intercourse without consent with knowledge
of the maximum possible penalty for the crime charged. 07 A
change of plea will be permitted only if it appears the defendant
was ignorant of his rights and the consequences of his act, he was
unduly and improperly influenced by hope or fear, or the plea was
100. Id., citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
101. Brown, - Mont. _, 605 P.2d at 187, citing State v. Lewis, 173 Mont. 1, 582 P.2d
236 (1978).
102. Brown, - Mont. , 605 P.2d at 187, citing State v. Doty, 173 Mont. 233, 566 P.2d
1388 (1977).
103. Brown, - Mont. _, 605 P.2d at 187.
104. Id. at -, 605 P.2d at 188.
105. - Mont. -, 607 P.2d 1128, 1131 (1980).
106. Id. at -, 607 P.2d at 1129, citing In re Brittingham, 155 Mont. 525, 529, 473 P.2d
830, 832 (1970).
107. Haynie, - Mont. -, 607 P.2d at 1130.
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entered under mistake or misapprehension."'8
In In re Hardy,10' the supreme court ruled that the trial
court's refusal to grant a motion to withdraw was not an abuse of
discretion. The court relied upon the standards in Haynie and
Brown to hold that the defendant was provided every chance to
consider his action, and was cognizant of his rights and the conse-
quences of his plea. Further, the court found that the defendant
was assisted by legal counsel at every point in the criminal proce-
dure, yet continued to insist on his guilty plea.110
B. Plea Bargaining
In Santabello v. New York,"' the United States Supreme
Court held that when a defendant enters a plea of guilty in ex-
change for an agreement by the prosecutor to make a sentencing
recommendation, the prosecutor's promise must be enforced or the
defendant allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. In State v. McKen-
zie (McKenzie III),"' however, the Montana Supreme Court, re-
viewing the record of the trial court, determined that there was not
an enforceable plea bargain agreement. Although defense counsel
and prosecutors engaged in some plea negotiations, an enforceable
agreement was never reached.118
The supreme court also found that the defendant neither con-
tended nor proved bad faith by the state in its discussions with
defense counsel on the plea bargain, or in the state's effort to se-
cure approval of the sheriff or the victim's parents. Therefore, the
trial court's actions in accepting the state's version and refusing to
enforce the alleged agreement were correct.114
In State v. Haynie,11 5 the supreme court considered the fact
that a guilty plea resulted from plea bargaining in its determina-
108. Id., citing State v. McAllister, 96 Mont. 348, 353, 30 P.2d 821, 823 (1934). The
supreme court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defen-
dant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea although the district court's colloquy was inade-
quate, where defendant, without explanation, waited almost five and a half years after en-
tering a plea in accordance with extended plea negotiation. Haynie, _ Mont. -, 607 P.2d at
1130.
109. - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 528, 530 (1980).
110. Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 531.
111. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
112. - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 428, 439 (1980).
113. Id. The McKenzie III court held that any disclosures or statements of defense
counsel concerning weaknesses in the state's case or defense positions were gratuitous and
premature. As the supreme court asserted, a trial is not a sporting contest in which the
verdict turned on such matters. Id.
114. Id. at -, 608 P.2d at 439.
115. - Mont. -, 607 P.2d 1128, 1130 (1980).
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tion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court would
not aid an accused to escape obligations of the plea bargain agree-
ment after knowingly and voluntarily accepting its benefits.116
VII. SPEEDY TRIAL
In Barker v. Wingo,117 the United States Supreme Court sug-
gested four major factors to be considered in making speedy trial
determinations: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the
delay; (3) the defendant's responsibility to assert his right; and (4)
the prejudice to the defendant. The fourth factor entails three
goals: to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, to minimize
anxiety of the accused, and to limit the chance of impairing the
defense. These factors are to be balanced, weighing conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant.
The Montana Supreme Court has forced prosecutors to justify
lengthy delays. In McKenzie III, the court denied a motion to dis-
miss for lack of speed when approximately 350 days had elapsed
between arrest and trial."8 The court held that although the delay
was not a per se violation, the length does shift the burden of ex-
plaining the reasons for the delay to the prosecution.11 9 The state's
delay was found justified because of the defendant's several court
appearances, his refusal to plead, and the difficulty in preparing
the first case under Montana's new criminal code and punishment
scheme. The court also found neither side chargeable for the
delay.12 0
The Barker balancing test was also applied in State v. Shurt-
liff,12  where a 382-day lapse between arrest and trial of defendant
on charges of deliberate homicide, robbery, and theft did not deny
defendant's right to a speedy trial. The delay required the state to
give reasons, and the court balanced defense delays against state
delays. The defense made a motion for substitution of the trial
judge; defense counsel was reassigned twice, requiring time to pre-
pare a new defense. The state was granted a continuance for 48
days when its most important witness left the United States; al-
though the state filed an amended information, the record revealed
116. Id. at -, 607 P.2d at 1132.
117. 407 U.S. 514 (1971).
118. - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 428, 440 (1980).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. - Mont. _, 609 P.2d 303 (1980).
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no action to stall for time to prepare. "
The Shurtliff court held that although defendant was in jail
for eleven months, the long delay was to his benefit: psychiatric
examinations wereoobtained, and new information and witnesses
were gathered.' 3 No facts suggested his case was weakened, and
the defense was actively prepared during this period. 2 '
Another lengthy delay of 319 days from filing of an informa-
tion to trial on a charge of robbery was justified in State v.
Worden.23 Although the supreme court found that most of the de-
lay was due to the state's conduct and that inherent delays caused
the rest of the delay,' 2 the court held that the ten-month incarcer-
ation prior to trial was mostly due to unrelated offenses. The de-
fendant showed no proof of impairment of ability to prepare a de-
fense. The supreme court therefore found no error, because no
prejudice resulted from the delay, even though the cause did not
proceed in an orderly step-by-step progression to trial. 27 For pur-
poses of determining a violation of defendant's speedy trial right,
intentional delay will weigh more heavily against the state than
those delays which are inherent in the system.12 8
Essentially the same issue was presented in State v. Case,"
where 340 days elapsed between the filing of the information and
trial. The supreme court reasoned that the only material distinc-
tion between Case and Worden was a delay of an additional 19
days before commencement of this trial. The defendant was there-
fore not denied the right to a speedy trial because the additional
delay under the same facts as Worden was not substantial.'3 "
A 108-day delay from filing of the information to trial was not
long enough to be presumptively prejudicial in State v. Arm-
strong,'31 precluding the need to examine other factors. The defen-
dant also contended that the delay of three and one-half years be-
tween the first and second conviction denied his right to a speedy
trial. '2 The court held, however, that the Montana district court
122. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 305.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. - Mont. _, 611 P.2d 185 (1980).
126. Id. at -, 611 P.2d at 187. The defendant was transferred to Malta instead of
Warm Springs, and the state failed to have defendant appear at two pre-trial hearings.
127. - Mont. _ 611 P.2d at 187.
128. Id.
129. - Mont. _, 621 P.2d 1066 (1980).
130. Id. at -, 621 P.2d at 1068.
131. - Mont. _, 616 P.2d 341 (1980).
132. Id. at -, 616 P.2d at 351, citing State v. Harvey, - Mont. -, 603 P.2d 661, 667
(1979).
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lacks jurisdiction to retry during the appellate process, and appeal
time is not included in the computation of a speedy trial delay.1 33
In another case, the Montana Supreme Court received a peti-
tion for writ of supervisory control 3 ' to direct a presiding judge in
the Fourth Judicial District to set within two weeks the criminal
trial of Larry D. White because of a speedy trial risk. The Mon-
tana Attorney General presented adverse factors in the handling of
criminal prosecutions in the Fourth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Judi-
cial Districts, affecting speedy trial:1 35 (1) indiscriminate use of the
disqualification rule; (2) not scheduling jury trials during summer
months; (3) independent calendaring of district judges in multi-
judge districts; (4) granting of continuances ex parte; and (5) rural
counties aligned with metropolitan counties. The supreme court
concluded, after reviewing these practices in several judicial dis-
tricts in Montana, 15 that: (1) widespread and indiscriminate dis-
qualification has been diminished, so the previous order permitting
disqualification would be continued; (2) the court retains jurisdic-
tion for purposes of review; (3) alignment of counties and equaliza-
tion of case loads is a matter of legislative action; (4) independent
calendaring was not a substantial factor; and (5) a chief judge
should be appointed in all multi-judge districts.1 37
VIII. PRE-TiAL IssuEs
A. Disqualification of Judges
The Montana Supreme Court addressed the issue of substitu-
tion of judges in McKenzie III. The defendant tried to disqualify
the trial judge for cause on grounds that the judge was a member
of the Criminal Law Revision Commission that drafted Montana's
present criminal code, that the judge had acquired information
during the plea-bargaining process which would make it impossible
to be impartial, and that the judge gave his own preliminary in-
133. Armstrong, - Mont. -, 616 P.2d at 351.
134. Final Order on Disqualification Rule and Retention on Jurisdiction on petition
for writ of supervisory control, 37 St. Rptr. 254 (1980).
135. Id.
136. In the Thirteenth Judicial District, the problem was ameliorated by (1) changes
in personnel and appointment of a fourth judge; (2) appointment of a chief justice; and (3)
change in local court rules for a "random-but-equal" case transfer system upon disqualifica-
tion. The court found no significant problem in the Fourth and Eighth Judicial Districts. In
the Sixteenth and Second Judicial Districts, routine disqualification of one judge by the
county attorney was to be discontinued without consultation of the Attorney General. Id. at
255.
137. 37 St. Rptr. at 256.
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struction to the jury.1 The court held that membership on the
Criminal Law Revision Commission did not per se constitute
grounds for disqualification because the Code of Judicial Conduct
permits a judge to "engage in activities to improve the law, the
legal system and the administration of justice."'3 The court also
found no facts or proof that the judge had assumed an adversary
position, and found that disclosure of information during plea-bar-
gaining was not sufficient grounds for disqualification.1 40
B. Appeal from Justice Court
In State v. Sanchez,1 41 the Montana Supreme Court deter-
mined the scope of two sections of the Montana Criminal Proce-
dure Code concerning an appeal by the state from a dismissal
order of a justice court. The defendant had been tried on mis-
demeanor charges of reckless driving and obstructing a peace of-
ficer. The justice of the peace granted a motion to dismiss the ob-
struction charge; the state sought to appeal the justice court's
dismissal by a trial de novo in district court.1 42
MCA § 46-17-311 (1979)148 allows a defendant to appeal a jus-
tice court order. The supreme court determined, however, that the
statute is applicable only to appealing defendants and not to the
state. 44 Under MCA § 46-20-103 (1979),15 the state can only ap-
138. McKenzie III, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d at 440.
139. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4 (1979).
140. McKenzie III, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d at 440.
141. - Mont. -, 610 P.2d 162 (1980).
142. Id. An attempt to retry in justice court was dismissed on double jeopardy
grounds.
143. MCA § 46-17-311 (1979) provides:
(1) All cases on appeal from justices' or city courts must be tried anew in the
district court and may be tried before a jury of six selected in the same manner as
a trial jury in a civil action, except that the total number of jurors drawn shall be
at least six plus the total number of peremptory challenges.
(2) The defendant may appeal to the district court by giving written notice of
his intention to appeal within 10 days after judgment.
(3) Within 30 days, the entire record of the justice's or city court proceedings
must be transferred to the district court or the appeal must be dismissed. It is the
duty of the defendant to perfect the appeal.
144. Sanchez, - Mont. -, 610 P.2d at 163.
145. MCA § 46-20-103 (1979) provides:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically authorized, the state may not appeal in a
criminal case.
(2) The state may appeal from any court order or judgment the substantive
effect of which results in:
(a) dismissing a case;
(b) modifying or changing the verdict as provided in 46-16-702(3)(c);
(c) granting a new trial;
(d) quashing an arrest or search warrant;
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peal dismissals from district court, and has no right to appeal the
final decision of a justice court in a criminal case. " 6
C. Continuance
Some useful guidelines for granting of continuances are set
forth in State v. Fife." " MCA § 46-13-202 (1979)148 defines the rule
for continuances, and requires a movant to show diligence prior to
asking for a continuance.
In Fife, the supreme court held that the district court had ac-
ted arbitrarily in denying a motion for a continuance requested to
allow the defense to locate a crucial witness who had failed to re-
spond to a subpoena. 4" The court applied the following guidelines:
(1) is the testimony material? (2) can it be elicited from another
source? (3) is it cumulative? (4) is it possible to get the witness
within a reasonable time? (5) was the requesting party diligent and
acting in good faith? (6) is there inconvenience to the court or par-
ties? (7) what is the likelihood the testimony would have affected
the jury? 150
D. Amendment of the Information
The Montana statute5 1 allowing amendment of an informa-
tion once as to substance without leave of court up to five days
prior to trial was held unconstitutional in State v. Cardwell.5 The
defendant contended that allowing substantive changes in an in-
formation without judicial examination violates Article II, Section
(e) suppressing evidence;
(f) suppressing a confession or admission; or
(g) granting or denying change of venue.
146. Sanchez, - Mont. -, 610 P.2d at 163.
147. - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 1069 (1980).
148. MCA § 46-13-202 (1979) provides:
(1) The defendant or the state may move for a continuance. If the motion is
made more than 30 days after arraignment or at any time after trial has begun,
the court may require that it be supported by affidavit.
(2) The court may upon the motion of either party or upon the court's own
motion order a continuance if the interests of justice so require.
(3) All motions for continuance are addressed to the discretion of the trial
court and shall be considered in the light of the diligence shown on the part of the
movant. This section shall be construed to the end that criminal cases are tried
with due diligence consonant with the rights of the defendant and the state to a
speedy trial.
149. Fife, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d at 1071-72.
150. Id., citing State v. Salazar, 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976).
151. MCA § 46-11-403(1) (1979) provides: "A charge may be amended once in matters
of substance at any time not less than 5 days before trial without leave of court."
152. _ Mont. _, 609 P.2d 1230 (1980).
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20, of the Montana Constitution, " which provides: "All criminal
actions in district court, except those on appeal, shall be prose-
cuted, either by information, after examination and commitment
by a magistrate or after leave granted by the court, or by indict-
ment without such examination, commitment, or leave."
The Montana Supreme Court found that the clear and unam-
biguous meaning of this constitutional section required that all
criminal actions "prosecuted" by information"' must be examined
by a magistrate or carried forward after leave granted by the court.
Thus, all stages of proceeding by information, including amend-
ments to the information, must be reviewed by the courts. 15 5 Any
statute that allows amendment without leave of court conflicts
with this constitutional provision. Since MCA § 46-11-403(1)
(1979) allows amendment of criminal information without judicial
supervision, it conflicts with the constitution and is invalid. The
court, however, saw no bar to substantive amendment of criminal
informations as long as proper procedures for judicial supervision
are followed.1 5 6
The Cardwell procedural safeguards governing substantive
amendments of criminal information were applied in State v. Sor-
enson.15 7 The three procedural safeguards, all of which were com-
plied with in Sorenson are: (1) the amended information must be
approved by the district court; (2) the defendant must have ade-
quate notice of the charge and an opportunity to prepare for trial;
and (3) the defendant "should" be rearraigned on the new
charge.158 The court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by
the existence of a procedural statute which was later ruled uncon-
stitutional. Therefore, the defendant had no standing to argue for
the retroactive application of the Cardwell rule. 159
In State v. Olson,160 the supreme court held that because both
153. Id. at _, 609 P.2d at 1231.
154. Id. at _, 609 P.2d at 1232, citing Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 408 (1821) and
Sigmon v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 258, 105 S.E.2d 171, 178 (1958). The court construed this
use of the word "prosecuted" by use of a broad general definition. The word "prosecution"
means the institution and carrying on of a suit or proceeding to obtain or enforce charges
against an offender before a legal tribunal. Montana has not yet interpreted an explicit defi-
nition of the term, but the supreme court has held the term too narrow to encompass inves-
tigation before filing a complaint or information. See Rosebud County v. Flinn, 109 Mont.
537, 541-42, 98 P.2d 330, 333-34 (1940).
155. Cardwell, - Mont. -, 609 P.2d at 1233.
156. Id.
157. - Mont. -, 619 P.2d 1185 (1980).
158. Id. at -, 619 P.2d at 1190-91, citing State v. Cardwell, - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 1031,
1033 (1980).
159. Sorenson, - Mont. -, 619 P.2d at 1190-91.
160. - Mont. _, 614 P.2d 1061 (1980).
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crimes charged in the informations might lead to the same punish-
ment and both theories were placed before the jury, there existed
no substantial departure from the original information that would
materially prejudice the defendant's case. 1 ' Any error which does
not affect the substantial rights of the defendant constitutes
"harmless error" and will not constitute grounds for reversal on
appeal. 162
IX. FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT ISSUES AT TRIAL
A. Double Jeopardy
The complicated issue of double jeopardy was addressed in
State v. Bad Horse'" when the defendant contended that his con-
viction of robbery in the first trial, with an acquittal of the charge
of deliberate homicide, was legally inconsistent and unsupportable.
The defendant also contended that the law of the case on this
point was established in his first appeal of his conviction, and that
the state was collaterally estopped from retrying the robbery con-
viction.'" The defendant was originally tried jointly with three
other defendants on charges of deliberate homicide, aggravated
kidnapping and robbery. In the first trial, defendant was found not
guilty of deliberate homicide and not guilty of aggravated kidnap-
ping, but guilty of robbery. On appeal in State v. Fitzpatrick,'"
the supreme court reversed and remanded his conviction for rob-
bery because of error in the instructions.
In Bad Horse the court compared the issues in Bad Horse
with the problem addressed in Fitzpatrick, where two jury instruc-
tions were legally inconsistent.1" Instruction No. 28 told the jury
that if a conspiracy to commit a crime existed and a death hap-
pened in furtherance of the conspiracy, all the conspirators were
guilty of the homicide. Instruction No. 36 told the jury that it
might find any one of four verdicts. 67 Fortunately for the defen-
dant in Bad Horse the jury in the first trial acquitted him on the
charge of deliberate homicide, preventing retrial on that charge
under the double jeopardy rule.'"8
161. Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 1062.
162. MCA § 46-20-701 (1979). See also State v. Armstrong, 172 Mont. 296, 300, 562
P.2d 1129, 1131 (1977).
163. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1113 (1980).
164. Id. at -, 605 P.2d at 1115.
165. 174 Mont. 174, 569 P.2d 383 (1977).
166. Id.
167. Bad Horse, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d at 1116.
168. Id.
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The Bad Horse court refused to find that the verdicts were so
inconsistent that defendant could never again be tried for robbery.
The remand for retrial on the underlying charge of robbery was
founded on the right of a defendant to receive a trial with a prop-
erly instructed jury.' 9 Therefore, a defendant is not subjected to
double jeopardy by virtue of his retrial after reversal of his judg-
ment of conviction.1 70
The court also rejected the collateral estoppel argument, be-
cause the court had remanded for retrial on the charge of robbery
so that the defendant could receive a trial with a properly in-
structed jury.17 1 Collateral estoppel means that when an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judg-
ment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same par-
ties.172 In Benton v. Maryland,7 8 the United States Supreme
Court held that collateral estoppel is a part of the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee against double jeopardy. In Bad Horse, however,
the conviction of robbery was not a final judgment, because ver-
dicts may be inconsistent and yet legally supportable and defen-
dant secured a reversal and remand from the supreme court.17 4
In State v. Davison,'75 the sentence for five additional years
under an enhancement statute, 6 which mandated an increased
prison sentence for an underlying crime if defendant used a dan-
gerous weapon, was held not to subject the defendant to multiple
punishments in violation of double jeopardy. In North Carolina v.
Pearce,7 7 the United States Supreme Court said that the double
jeopardy clause protects against multiple punishments for the
same offense. The issue in Pearce, however, was whether the prohi-
bition against double jeopardy was violated when punishment for
an offense was not fully credited in imposing sentence upon a new
conviction for the same offense.77 The court in Davison held that
the statute involved merely enhances the penalty based on an ad-
ditional factor-the use of a firearm-and does not create or pe-
169. Id. See MCA § 46-16-401(5) (1979); State v. Jackson, 88 Mont. 420, 435, 293 P.
309, 318 (1930).
170. See State v. Sandus, 163 Mont. 209, 216, 516 P.2d 372, 376 (1973); State v. Ells-
worth, 141 Mont. 78, 81, 375 P.2d 316, 318 (1962).
171. Bad Horse, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d at 1117.
172. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
173. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
174. Bad Horse, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d at 1117.
175. - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 489, 497 (1980).
176. MCA § 46-18-221 (1979) imposes an additional mandatory sentence on a defen-
dant found guilty of an offense while knowingly using a dangerous weapon.
177. 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
178. Id.
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nalize the defendant for a separate offense."7'
Federal District Court Judge Russell E. Smith issued an order
denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Campbell v.
Crist,180 rejecting defendant's double jeopardy arguments that he
had received three convictions for one offense of robbery. The
court held that one judgment of conviction was ordered following a
plea of guilty.181 A second order merely placed the defendant on
probation and imposed conditions. The third order, a revocation of
probation enforcing conditions of the initial judgment, did not of-
fend the double jeopardy clause.182
B. Jury Selection
Voir dire affords the defendant an opportunity to probe atti-
tudes of potential jurors concerning issues at trial. In McKenzie
I11,183 the defendant claimed prejudice because he was not allowed
to voir dire the jury on the subject of mental disease or defect. The
Montana Supreme Court had previously held that where notice of
a defense of mental disease or defect is given, a refusal to allow
voir dire on this defense constitutes prejudicial error. 84 The Mc-
Kenzie III court held that the defendant was properly not allowed
to voir dire on this defense because he did not give any notice of
the defense.1 8 5
The defendant in State v. Sunday 8'" claimed prejudice from
denial of his motion for individual voir dire. The court held, how-
ever, that the defendant never demonstrated the extent of any pre-
trial publicity, its inflammatory nature or whether it had any effect
on prospective jurors."' Moreover, the defense passed the jury
panel without challenging any potential juror for cause due to bias
or prejudice. 8
The Montana Supreme Court requires a high level of juror
prejudice to mandate the disqualification of a juror. "It is only
where they form fixed opinions on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant which they would not be able to lay aside and render a
verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court that they
179. Davison, - Mont. -, 614 P.2d at 498.
180. 37 St. Rptr. 1328 (1980).
181. Id. at 1330.
182. Id., citing United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979).
183. McKenzie III, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d at 441.
184. State v. Olson, 156 Mont. 339, 480 P.2d 822 (1971).
185. McKenzie III, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d at 441.
186. - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 1188 (1980).
187. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 1193.
188. Id.
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become disqualified as jurors." 8" This standard was applied in
State v. Bashor'90 to uphold the trial court's refusal to allow a
challenge for cause against the dancing instructor of a homicide
victim's daughter. Although the prospective juror told defense
counsel she was not sure she could be fair and impartial, she later
assured the court that she could put emotions aside and judge the
defendant solely on evidence presented at trial." '9
Another aspect of the jury selection process is the right to ob-
serve deliberations of public bodies. This right is expressly granted
under Article II, section 9 of the Montana Constitution, which
provides:
Right to know. No person shall be deprived of the right to
examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public
bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, ex-
cept in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly
exceeds the merits of public disclosure. (Emphasis added).
After a district court ordered individual voir dire examination of
prospective jurors in a criminal case closed to the press and the
public, a newspaper sought a writ of supervisory control from the
supreme court directing the district court to: (1) permit a newspa-
per reporter to attend and observe the voir dire; and (2) hold a
hearing to determine whether defendant's right to a fair trial was
jeopardized. The supreme court in Great Falls Tribune v. District
Court' 91" directed the district court to hold the hearing. Upon find-
ing no prejudice to the defendant, the supreme court entered an
order vacating the closure and directed that the press and public
be allowed to observe the voir dire.'"
The supreme court found nothing in news articles, scripts of
radio and television broadcasts, or in subjecting prospective jurors
to an open and public voir dire examination that would deny or
impair defendant's right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury
under federal and state constitutional guarantees. ' " The publicity
in this case was neither massive nor pervasive enough to influence
jurors and insure a conviction as in Sheppard v. Maxwell'9 5 or
Estes v. Texas.'9"
189. Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 116, 120 (1980).
190. - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 470 (1980).
191. Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 478.
192. - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 116 (1980).
193. Id. at _, 608 P.2d at 121.
194. Id. at -, 608 P.2d at 120.
195. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
196. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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The purpose of voir dire in a criminal proceeding is to deter-
mine the existence of prejudice and bias of prospective jurors and
to enable counsel to exercise peremptory challenges.1 97 The court
in Great Falls Tribune was unable to see how closing the examina-
tion to the public was necessary to guarantee a fair trial. 98 In up-
holding the Montana constitutional provision as a stricter standard
than that imposed by the United States Constitution, the Montana
Supreme Court stated: "Closing any part of the trial is simply the
first step down the primrose path that leads to destruction of those
societal values that open, public trials promote. Nothing short of
strict and irreparable necessity to ensure defendant's right to a fair
trial should suffice."' 99
C. Opening Statement and Closing Argument
In State v. West,200 the prosecutor recited in the opening
statement hearsay evidence which connected the defendant with
the charge of theft. The hearsay evidence was subsequently ruled
inadmissible, and was held highly prejudicial, requiring reversal of
the conviction.
MCA § 46-16-501(6) (1979)201 allows an attorney to comment
on the evidence of the case in closing argument. An attorney may
argue and draw reasonable inferences from evidence so long as
there are facts to support the statements.20 The state, in State v.
Bashor,2° made statements contrary to results of a polygraph ex-
amination which had been given to a prosecution witness and
which had been excluded from evidence by the court. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court held that because the state presented evi-
dence to support the prosecution's version of the homicide, the
closing remarks did not exceed the bounds of comment and rea-
sonable argument which may be made. ° '
197. State v. Stuit, 176 Mont. 184, 576 P.2d 264 (1978).
198. Great Falls Tribune, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d at 120.
199. Id. at -, 608 P.2d at 121.
200. - Mont. -, 617 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1980).
201. MCA § 46-16-401(6) (1979) provides:
When the jury has been charged, unless the case is submitted to the jury on
either side or on both sides without argument, the county attorney must com-
mence and may conclude the argument. If several defendants having several de-
fenses appear by different counsel, the court must determine their relative order
in evidence and argument. Counsel, in arguing the case to the judge or jury, may
argue and comment upon the law of the case as given in the instructions of the
court, as well as upon the evidence of the case.
202. State v. Moore, 112 Ariz. 271, 277, 540 P.2d 1252, 1256 (1975).
203. - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 470, 480 (1980).
204. Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 482.
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D. The Right to Confront Witnesses
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees a defendant the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. In State v. Sheriff,0 5 the district court did not allow a
defendant being tried for robbery to cross-examine the police of-
ficer as to defendant's willingness to take a polygraph test.2' On
review, the supreme court held that the omission of the inquiry did
not so prejudice the defendant that a different verdict would have
been reached.0 7 The prosecution did not contend that the defen-
dant failed to cooperate with the police. The defendant was able to
take the stand and testify in his own defense as to his full coopera-
tion with the police. 08 The fact that he was also willing to take a
polygraph test would not be determinative in the case, especially
when such tests generally are not allowed as evidence in a criminal
trial.2 09
The Sixth Amendment also guarantees a criminal the right to
testimony of witnesses in his favor.2 10 The Montana Supreme
Court held in State v. Higley" that it does not, however, guaran-
tee the right to any and all witnesses, regardless of their compe-
tency and knowledge.
The supreme court also found that the Montana rules limiting
inquiry into sexual conduct of the victim"'2 are essential to pre-
serve the integrity of the trial and to prevent it from becoming a
trial of the victim, whose character is not in issue. ' 3 The court
found no denial of the defendant's rights in this limitation. The
Montana Rules of Evidence2 14 allow the judge to inquire into spe-
205. - Mont. -, 619 P.2d 181 (1980).
206. Id. at -, 619 P.2d at 184.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id., citing State v. Bashor, - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 470 (1980).
210. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
211. - Mont. ., 621 P.2d 1043 (1980).
212. MCA § 45-5-503(5) (1979) prevents introduction of evidence of the victim's sex-
ual conduct and provides in part: "No evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim
is admissible in prosecutions under this section ... " MoNr. R. EviD. 608(b) provides in
pertinent part:
Specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or sup-
porting his credibility, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, how-
ever, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,
be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness ....
213. Higley, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1050.
214. MoNT. R. EVmn. 405(b), Commission Comments set out the justification for keep-
ing out evidence of specific acts of conduct:
This method of proof is the most persuasive of the three contained in the
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cific acts on cross-examination, if such acts are probative of truth-
fulness of a witness. It is doubtful, however, that testimony con-
cerning the victim's sexual views comes within this rule at all.,1 '
The court held that it is clearly within the judge's discretion to
exclude this evidence if it is irrelevant or too prejudicial.' 16 The
court also held that this kind of evidence has little if any probative
value.217
X. POST-TRIAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Sentencing
1. Substantive Issues
The Montana Supreme Court in State v. Sunday219 applied
several important sentencing considerations. Sentences of one hun-
dred years each for two deliberate homicides, ten years for bur-
glary, and ten years for theft, the term to be served consecutively
with defendant ineligible for parole or the work furlough program
were held not excessive under the circumstances. 2'19 The court jus-
tified the sentences with such factors as the need to protect society
because of defendant's extensive criminal record, his uncaring atti-
tude, and the malevolent way in which he committed the crimes."20
The district court, however, did not have the authority to sentence
defendant to twenty years for burglary because the maximum pos-
sible sentence was ten years imprisonment under Montana
statute.21
Even though the defendant in State v. Stumpf 222 was sen-
tenced well within statutory limits after conviction of tampering
with witnesses, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed
to specify reasons for the sentence."38 The supreme court held that
the statute proscribing tampering with witnesses was not required
to contain sentencing guidelines, and recognized the trial court's
rule, and is also the most likely "to arouse undue prejudice, to confuse and dis-
tract, to engender time-consuming side issues and to create risk of unfair sur-
prise." McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 443 (2d ed. 1972). As a
result of the effect of this method of proof, it is generally restricted to situations
where character is in issue, when such proof is central to the outcome of the case.
215. Higley, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1050.
216. See MoNT. R. EVID. 608(b), Commission Comments.
217. Higley, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1050.
218. - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 1188 (1980).
219. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 1198.
220. Id. See also MCA § 46-18-202 (1979).
221. Sunday, - Mont. -, 609 P.2d at 1198.
222. - Mont. _, 609 P.2d 298 (1980).
223. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 299.
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right to exercise discretion in sentencing within statutory limits.2 24
The court noted that the requirement that the sentencing docu-
ment state specific reasons for imposing a particular sentence2 25 is
consistent with the Montana Canons of Judicial Ethics.22
In a different context, the supreme court determined in Mat-
ter of McFadden"27 that a sentencing court must state its reasons
underlying a determination that an offender was to be designated
as a dangerous offender. Under MCA § 46-18-404(1)(b) (1979), an
individual may be designated a dangerous offender, if, in the dis-
cretion of the sentencing court, he is determined to represent a
substantial danger to other persons or society. The McFadden re-
cord revealed that the district court never made a finding of sub-
stantial danger, but rather concluded that petitioner was not
rehabilitatable because he had not been truthful with the court.12 8
The designation as dangerous offender therefore was not supported
by substantial credible evidence.''
The refusal of the sentencing judge to designate the defendant
in State v. Higley as either "dangerous" or "non-dangerous" with-
out a psychological examination of defendant did not prejudice the
defendant.230 MCA § 46-18-102 (1979) requires a sentence to be
rendered within a "reasonable time." Delays will be upheld if they
are found to be in the interest of justice. 3' The delay in Higley
appeared to have been in the best interests of the defendant and
was held reasonable under the circumstances." Additionally, the
lack of designation requires that the defendant be considered non-
dangerous for purposes of parole under Montana statute.'
224. Id., citing MCA § 45-7-206 (1979).
225. Ballantyne v. Anaconda Co., 175 Mont. 406, 574 P.2d 582 (1978) (sets forth why
the trial court should record reasons underlying its decisions).
226. Montana Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 19, 144 Mont. at xxvi-xxvii provides
in pertinent part:
In disposing of controverted cases, a judge should indicate the reasons for his ac-
tion in an opinion showing that he has not disregarded or overlooked serious argu-
ments of counsel, He thus shows his full understanding of the case, avoids the
suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promotes confidence in his intellectual integrity
and may contribute useful precedent to the growth of the law.
227. - Mont. _, 608 P.2d 191 (1980).
228. Id. at -, 608 P.2d at 192.
229. Id.
230. Higley, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1056.
231. Balduc v. United States, 363 F.2d 832, 833-34 (5th Cir. 1966); Treakle v. United
States, 326 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1964).
232. Higley, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1056.
233. Id., citing MCA § 46-18-404(3) (1979).
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2. Procedural Issues
Irregularities in presentence report procedures were the bases
of several petitions to the Montana Supreme Court. The petitioner
in Spurlock v. Crist23 4 claimed that he was prejudiced because he
did not have an opportunity to examine the presentence report
prior to sentencing nor to cross-examine witnesses with respect to
the report. The supreme court held, however, that although a con-
victed defendant has a due process guarantee against a sentence
predicated on misinformation,3 5 he will not be granted a resen-
tencing where there are no errors or ambiguities in the presentence
report.236
The defendant in State v. Lopez237 was also not entitled to
relief on the basis that his presentence report did not consider
needs and potentialities of defendant or any aspects of rehabilita-
tion, because defendant was given copies of the presentence and
psychological reports and was able to cross-examine the author of
his presentence report, and because many witnesses testified for
defendant at the dispositional hearing.2 8
In State v. Higley,239 the defendant's right to be sentenced
under circumstances free from misinformation was violated by an
in-chambers interview conducted by the district judge with the vic-
tim to determine her feelings as to an appropriate sentence; defen-
dant was not present.24 0 Even though the United States Supreme
Court has found no violation of due process in denying confronta-
tion of witnesses in a sentencing hearing,24 1 and the Montana Su-
preme Court has noted that the right of cross-examination in a
presentencing hearing is a discretionary matter with the trial
court, 42 the lack of cross-examination or chance to refute the in-
formation in this case was held to violate defendant's due process
right to be sentenced free from misinformation.43
While there is no right to a jury trial on sentencing or com-
pelled attendance of persons supplying hearsay information, Cava-
234. - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 498 (1980).
235. Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 501, citing State v. Osborn, 170 Mont. 480, 555 P.2d 509
(1976).
236. Spurlock, - Mont. -, 614 P.2d at 501.
237. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 178 (1980).
238. Id. at -, 605 P.2d at 184.
239. - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1043 (1980).
240. Id. at -, 621 P.2d at 1050.
241. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949).
242. Cavanaugh v. Crist, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 890, 894 (1980); State v. Osborn, 170
Mont. 480, 485, 555 P.2d 509, 512 (1976).
243. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949).
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naugh v. Crist24" again required certain protections in ordinary
sentencing. A defendant has the right to counsel at sentencing,2 45
to have his sentence based on accurate information,4 6 and to be
free of abuse of the judge's sentencing discretion.2 47 In addition, a
district judge must now state reasons for the sentence he imposed
in the record in every case.24 8
State v. Haynie2"9 affirms an indigent criminal defendant's
right to counsel at sentencing, but recognizes that this right to
counsel may be lost by understanding and knowing waiver by the
defendant. 250 The Haynie defendant, no novice to the criminal jus-
tice system, rejected the offer to consult with his stand-in counsel
at the sentencing hearing.2 51 The court held that the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused, and the circumstances of
the case indicated an understanding and knowing waiver of the
right to counsel. 2 52
B. Parole and Probation
1. Limiting Parole Eligibility
The defendant in State v. Beachman2 53 claimed that the trial
court erred in sentencing him under a statute not in effect when
the offense was committed. The offense in this case occurred in
late June, 1975; defendant was apprehended, tried, and convicted
in 1979.'" The trial court's declaration that the defendant was a
dangerous offender and ineligible for parole under statutes enacted
by the 1977 legislature 55 was held ex post facto as applied to de-
fendant and unconstitutional, and was ordered stricken from the
judgment and sentence. 56
244. - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 890 (1980).
245. Id. at -, 615 P.2d at 894, citing Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
246. Cavanaugh, - Mont. _, 615 P.2d at 894, citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736
(1948).
247. Cavanaugh, - Mont. _, 615 P.2d at 894, citing State v. Steward, 175 Mont. 286,
287, 573 P.2d 1138, 1139 (1977).
248. Cavanaugh, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d at 894, citing State v. Stumpf, - Mont. -, 609
P.2d 298 (1980).
249. - Mont. -, 607 P.2d 1128 (1980).
250. Id. at -, 607 P.2d at 1130, citing In re Brittingham, 155 Mont. 525, 529, 473 P.2d
830, 832 (1970).
251. Haynie, - Mont. -, 607 P.2d at 1131.
252. Id.
253. - Mont. -, 616 P.2d 337 (1980).
254. Id. at -, 616 P.2d at 440.
255. MCA §§ 46-18-202, -404 (1979).
256. Beachman, - Mont. -, 616 P.2d at 441.
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Although the statute, 57 which provides that a designation as a
nondangerous offender enables a prisoner to be eligible for parole
after he had served one quarter of his sentence, was amended by
the 1979 legislature, the petition for postconviction relief in State
v. McFadden" had to be considered in accordance with statutory
provisions in effect at the time of sentencing in 1978.
The constitutionality of the Montana statute25 9 permitting a
judge to sentence convicted persons to imprisonment with no pos-
sibility of parole or participation in a furlough program was upheld
in Cavanaugh v. Crist.210 Due process standards are required
where a sentence is to be enhanced on the basis of a psychiatric
evaluation, past behavior, and pursuant to a separate act.21 These
requirements, however, do not apply to MCA § 46-18-202(2)
(1979), which is not a sentence enhancement statute, because the
statute does not permit district judges to add any time beyond the
statutory maximum for the underlying offense.262 The restriction
on parole and furlough eligibility has no existence beyond the term
of the sentence imposed for the underlying offense.2"
The Cavanaugh court held that the statute does not deprive
defendants of equal protection2 " by providing different punish-
ment for different persons for the same act, because every sentenc-
ing provision allows the sentencer to consider past life and habits
of the offender.2"
Parole and participation in the furlough program are privi-
leges, not rights."" The statute in question merely allows a district
judge to restrict conditional release and determine that a defen-
dant should serve his full sentence for the protection of society. 61
The supreme court also found the contention that the statute un-
lawfully delegates legislative authority to the judicial branch by
permitting excessive judicial discretion was without merit.2 " A dis-
trict judge was found to be particularly well-positioned to predict
257. MCA § 46-18-404(1) (1979).
258. - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 191, 192 (1980).
259. MCA § 46-18-202(2) (1979).
260. - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 890 (1980).
261. Spacht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967).
262. Cavanaugh, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d at 893.
263. Id.
264. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV.
265. Cavanaugh, - Mont. _, 615 P.2d at 894, citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949).
266. Cavanaugh, - Mont. _, 615 P.2d at 895, citing Lopez v. Crist, 176 Mont. 352, 355,
578 P.2d 312, 314 (1978).
267. Cavanaugh, - Mont. _, 615 P.2d at 895.
268. Id.
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whether the restriction is necessary for the protection of society in
light of the offender's personal and criminal history, apparent will-
ingness to conform to society's rules, and other factors.' 6
2. Conditions of Parole or Probation
MCA § 46-18-201(b) (1979) permits a trial court, when placing
a person on probation, to impose any reasonable restrictions on the
defendant during the period of probation, as long as the conditions
are reasonably related to rehabilitation or the protection of society.
MCA § 56-18-202 (1979) is a broad grant of authority permitting a
trial court to impose additional restrictions which may be consid-
ered necessary to carry out these two objectives. Article II, section
28 of the Montana Constitution sets guidelines for imposition of
conditions by providing that "[lI]aws for the punishment of crime
shall be founded on the principles of prevention and reformation
Conditions imposed on defendant's probation that (1) he sub-
mit to search of his person, premises, or vehicles at any time by
lawful authorities, without a search warrant and (2) he submit to a
polygraph examination at any time, the results of which may be
used in any proceeding in court in which defendant is involved
were constitutionally attacked in State v. Fogarty.2 70 While dicta
in the majority opinion in State v. Means27 1 seemed to indicate
that a search provision is not constitutionally offensive, the su-
preme court in Fogarty noted that the opinion turned on the con-
clusion that probable cause to search existed independent of the
provision. The court therefore expressly overruled Means to the
extent that it could be interpreted as permitting an unlimited
search provision as a condition of parole.2 72
The court also held that defendant could not be required to
submit to a polygraph examination at any time because the condi-
tion was overly broad under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.2 78 The court further held that the un-
limited search provision was patently unconstitutional because a
269. Id.
270. - Mont. _, 610 P.2d 140 (1980).
271. - Mont. _, 581 P.2d 406, 412-13 (1978).
272. Fogarty, - Mont. -, 610 P.2d at 144. The circumstances underlying the imposi-
tion of the questioned provisions shed little light on why the conditions were imposed. The
search and polygraph provisions were inserted in the judgment as part of a ten-year sus-
pended sentence given to defendant after he entered a guilty plea for selling a lid of mari-
juana to an acquaintance. The court also found the record silent as to why the trial court
imposed either condition. Id.
273. Fogarty, - Mont. -, 610 P.2d at 144.
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search warrant based on probable cause must be obtained before a
probationer's residence can be searched and because a search must
be reasonable as to time, place, and manner.1
7 4
The Fogarty court held that the state has a right to require a
probationer to submit to warrantless searches or polygraphs only
to the extent that he can legitimately be denied his full constitu-
tional protections as a result of his status.275 A defendant who ac-
cepts conditions of probation does not thereby waive the right to
attack the constitutionality of the conditions, because the waiver
cannot be termed voluntary when the alternative is prison.'7 A
probationer must expect that his constitutional rights may be jus-
tifiably limited during probation, but the limitations must be rea-
sonable. 7 7 A probationer's protection against self-incrimination
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution would not prevent requiring him to answer all reason-
able inquiries of his probation officer.'7 8
The Fogarty court reasoned that a probationary status can
and should carry a reduced expectation of privacy.'7 ' Prosecuting
attorneys and law enforcement officers are not involved in the pro-
bation process, however, and therefore a sentencing court may not
permit them to search the probationer without a warrant as a con-
dition to probation.8
The Montana Supreme Court in Fogarty recommended that
if, upon consideration of the circumstances of the case, the sen-
tencing court determines that the conditions of parole should in-
clude a reasonable search or polygraph provision, the court should
state the reasons on the record.'
Another question underlying the use of a polygraph clause is
the use to which the test results are put. The Fogarty court held
that test results adverse to the probationer are not sufficiently
trustworthy in and of themselves to cause revocation of
probation.'8'
274. Id. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; Mowr. CONST. art. II, §§ 10 and 11.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Fogarty, - Mont. -, 610 P.2d at 146.
278. Id. at _, 610 P.2d at 150.
279. Id. at _, 610 P.2d at 151. See also U.S. CoNT. amend. IV; MONT. CONST. art. II,
§§ 10 and 11.
280. Fogarty, - Mont. -, 610 P.2d at 151.
281. Id. at -, 610 P.2d at 154.
282. Id.
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C. Post-Conviction Relief
The district judge in State v. Higley denied the defendant's
request to be present at a post-conviction hearing held to deter-
mine whether defendant was eligible for bail pending appeal. 3
The Montana Supreme Court held that defendant is not required
to be present at proceedings occurring after the verdict, because
these proceedings are not part of the trial.284
MCA § 46-21-102 (1979) provides that "[a] petition for ...
relief may be filed at any time after conviction." In re McNair'8a
raised the issue of whether the doctrine of laches would apply to
prevent a defendant from challenging the validity of his sentence
eight and one-half years after imposition of sentence. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court found that the Montana legislature did not
intend to impose an absolute time constraint on the filing of an
application for post-conviction relief.'s
The finding that petitioner was entitled to file his petition at
any time did not, however, necessitate a finding that he was enti-
tled to the relief sought. Numerous federal courts have considered
the problem of delay in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions for post-convic-
tion relief, with many courts finding that delay can have a negative
effect on the good faith and credibility of the moving party.81
In addition to the problem of good faith, the McNair court
noted that long delay may prove to be highly prejudicial if the
state is forced to try a case eight and one-half years later. The
practical problems of dying witnesses, fading memories, and chang-
ing government officials demand that the applications for relief be
made promptly.'" Therefore, the McNair court was entitled to
283. - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1043, 1057 (1980).
284. Id., citing State v. Peters, 146 Mont. 188, 197, 405 P.2d 642, 647 (1965) (not error
for defendant not to be present at a motion for new trial).
285. - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 916, 917 (1980).
286. Id., citing Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring), in which the court noted that a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976), which is
similar to MCA § 46-21-102 (1979), "means that, as in habeas corpus, there is no statute of
limitations, no res judicata, and that the doctrine of laches is inapplicable."
287. Aiken v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 43, 50 (M.D. N.C.), aff'd 296 F.2d 604 (4th
Cir. 1961). See also Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 531 (4th Cir. 1970).
288. See Desmond v. United States, 333 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1964). In Pacelli v.
United States, 588 F.2d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979), the court
cited Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States Dis-
trict Courts:
A motion for relief made pursuant to these rules may be dismissed if it appears
that the government has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the motion by
delay in its filing unless the movant shows that it is based on grounds of which he
could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the
circumstances prejudicial to the government occurred.
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take the delay into account on the question of defendant's good
faith and on the question of possible prejudice to the state.28 9
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A defense attorney's failure to render adequate assistance
results in a denial of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel
and therefore requires reversal of his conviction.2 90 In Montana the
right to counsel is guaranteed by the Montana Constitution as well
as by the Sixth Amendment. 2  Both these provisions guarantee
that the right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance
of counsel.2 92 The United States Supreme Court has largely left the
determination of what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel
to the "good sense and discretion of the trial court.12 9 The federal
circuit courts use various standards for judging ineffectiveness.
The Third2 9" and Eighth Circuits 95 use an effectiveness standard
requiring that defense attorneys act with the prevailing customary
skill and knowledge. The Fourth Circuit 29" requires that defense
counsel act within a "range of incompetence ' 29 7 to be found inef-
fective. The Tenth Circuit298 has adopted a reasonableness test by
which an attorney is to represent his client in the manner expected
of a "reasonable, competent, and skillful defense attorney. 2 9 9 The
First,300 Fifth, 0' Sixth,3 0 2 and Ninth Circuits303 require that coun-
289. McNair, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d at 918.
290. See State v. Lopez, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 178 (1980); State v. McElveen, 168
Mont. 500, 544 P.2d 820 (1975).
291. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24.
292. State v. Rose, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 1074, 1080 (1980); State v. Bubnash, 139
Mont. 517, 522, 366 P.2d 155, 158 (1961).
293. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
294. See, e.g., United States v, Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1980) (counsel's
failure to raise defense may have resulted in representation below standard of customary
skill and knowledge).
295. See, e.g., Dupree v. United States, 606 F.2d 829, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980) (defendant must show that counsel failed to perform an essen-
tial duty and that this failure was prejudicial).
296. See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (failure by defense counsel found to be outside the range of
competence).
297. Id. at 543.
298. See, e.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980) (lack of "vigor" by counsel
did not fall below that expected of a reasonable, competent and skillful attorney).
299. Id. at 278.
300. See, e.g., United States v. Thomann, 609 F.2d 560, 566-67 (1st Cir. 1979) (overall
defense found to be reasonably competent despite counsel's failure to object to a question-
able charge).
301. See, e.g., Lucas v. Wainwright, 604 F.2d 373, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(failure to object held not ineffective assistance).
302. See, e.g., United States v. Renfro, 600 F.2d 55, 58-59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
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sel's assistance be reasonably effective. The United States Supreme
Court has also utilized this standard of reasonably effective assis-
tance in determining whether counsel's misevaluation of a consti-
tutional claim provides a basis for challenging a subsequent guilty
plea.3s "
The Second Circuits 5 is the only circuit which still uses the
traditional "sham and mockery test."30 6 Since the Supreme Court
employed the reasonably effective assistance test, the constitution-
ality of the "sham and mockery test" has been questioned.30 7 This
has led to its widespread abandonment.
In State v. Rose308 the Montana Supreme Court also aban-
doned the "sham and mockery test." To prevail on a claim of con-
stitutionally inadequate representation under that test, a defen-
dant had "the burden of proving his counsel's performance was so
woefully inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court and
make the resultant proceeding a farce and mockery of justice."3 "
To determine the adequacy of the representation, the court would
examine the services rendered by defense counsel, including spe-
cific alleged mistakes committed at trial. Yet, the court was careful
not to test the services rendered by defense counsel against the
"greater sophistication of appellate counsel" nor by appellate
counsel's "opportunity to study the record at leisure and cite dif-
ferent tactics of perhaps doubtful efficacy."810
In Rose, the Montana Supreme Court adopted the "reasonably
effective assistance test" stating that "persons accused of crime are
entitled, to the effective assistance of counsel acting within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. ' 3's
U.S. 876 (1979) (overall defense found to be reasonably effective assistance).
303. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 616 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1980) (good faith
error by counsel not ineffective assistance); United States v. Currie, 589 F.2d 993, 995-96
(9th Cir. 1979) (several specific alleged errors found not to have prejudiced the defendant).
304. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970).
305. See, e.g., Brinkley v. Lefevre, 621 F.2d 45, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (re-
fusal to abandon sham and mockery test despite dissenting opinion urging that it should be
unconstitutional).
306. The sham and mockery test was derived from the outmoded belief that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees only the assistance of counsel, rather than effective assistance. See
Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Under the sham and mockery standard
the defendant was required to show that his counsel's incompetence rendered the proceed-
ing a farce and mockery of justice. Id. at 669.
307. See Brinkley v. Lefevre, 621 F.2d 45, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1980) (Weinstein, J.,
dissenting).
308. - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 1074 (1980).
309. State v. Lopez, _ Mont. -, 605 P.2d 178, 180 (1980).
310. Id.
311. Rose, - Mont. _, 608 P.2d at 1081.
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Among the reasons the court cited for adopting this test was that it
provides a more objective standard for determining
ineffectiveness.3 12
Under this new test the court still considers the alleged spe-
cific failures committed by the defense attorney. The court will de-
termine whether these are "errors a reasonably competent attorney
acting as a diligent conscientious advocate would not have
made."313 Where the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rests
upon specific alleged errors committed at trial, the court will not
grant relief unless it appears that the defendant was prejudiced by
counsel's conduct.3 14
For the most part courts have generally not established spe-
cific criteria which show when the standard of reasonably effective
assistance has been breached. Certain acts and omissions, however,
appear to be especially likely to establish a breach of this standard.
Courts have often criticized an attorney's neglect to properly pre-
pare the case,31' his failure to investigate or develop evidence
favorable to his client's case,316 or his failure to appeal a conviction
or request a mistrial.3 17 Failure to provide an indigent client with a
necessary expert witness may also constitute ineffective assis-
tance.313 Yet, minimal pretrial client contact may not by itself con-
stitute evidence of ineffective assistance.3 1 9
The Montana Supreme Court, in State v. Poncelet,3s 0 ruled
that a defendant who elects to proceed pro se, and is given every
effort of assistance by the court in submitting his case to the jury,
312. Id. The phrase "farce and mockery" has no obvious intrinsic meaning. What may
appear a "farce" to one court may seem a humdrum proceeding to another. The meaning of
the Sixth Amendment does not, of course, vary with the sensibilities and subjective judg-
ments of various courts. The law demands objective explanation, so as to ensure the even
dispensation of justice. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1974).
313. Rose, - Mont. _ 608 P.2d at 1081.
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 594 (3d Cir. 1980); Rose, _
Mont. -, 608 P.2d at 1082.
316. See, e.g., Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214, 1217-20 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated on
other grounds, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 1827 (1980) (failure to develop defendant's only possible
defense held to breach the standard); United States v. Johnson, 615 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (failure to investigate held breach of standard); United States v.
Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 594 (3d Cir. 1980) (failure to assert defense held to breach
standard).
317. See, e.g., Miller v. McCarthy, 606 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1979) (failure to appeal
in a timely manner held to breach standard).
318. See Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682-83 (5th Cir. 1979).
319. See United States v. Maguire, 600 F.2d 330, 332 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 876 (1979); Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1980); Jones v.
Wainwright, 604 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
320. - Mont. -, 610 P.2d 698 (1980).
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cannot complain on appeal that the quality of his own defense
acted to his detriment by not amounting to effective counsel.3 21
Carol Everly and Greg S. Mullowney
321. Id. at -, 610 P.2d at 709.
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